It was more than four decades ago when James 
Introduction:
Following the dramatic times of subprime market failure in the U.S. extensive debates are taking place on how we can avoid similar events in the future. The postulation underlying these discussions is that financial crisis emerged from the structure of the post Bretton-Woods financial system and the depression which followed was actually caused by financial crisis itself. This type of reasoning appeared both in mainstream and heterodox economics. Mainstream economists are elaborating on the idea of "moral hazard" (Farhi & Tirole 2009 ) and heterodox economists on the "lethal mix of consumer credit with investment banking" (Lapavitsas 2009 ).
Reasonably the discussion turned to financial system regulation policies.
Suggestions on: separation of credit from investment banking, implementation of a new Bretton Woods treaty ensuring and regulating capital flows from surplus to deficit countries and regulation on bank executive bonuses are some of the ideas appearing in literature. Following the academic research legislators and policy makers are undertaking financial regulatory measures aiming to remove the causes of the crisis, thereby establishing the prerequisites for sustainable growth.
In the meantime, however, the crisis is taking its' own course. Despite trillions spent to avoid meltdown in global financial markets, stagnation prevails in major economies, whereas sovereign debt crisis haunts peripheral countries in the EU south and Latin America, recently threatening also BRIC countries like India and Brazil.
The duration and severity of the crisis has led economists like Paul Krugman Contrary to the majority opinion in the profession, this paper argues that major financial crisis episodes are manifestations of deteriorating conditions in production and growth, and not the opposite. This causal link can explain the subprime market failure and asses the likelihood of major financial crisis episodes in the current phase.
Following the subprime market collapse banks were given vast state funds through capital injection and asset purchases, while enjoying unlimited central bank accommodation usually against low-grade collateral. The greatest part of these funds, however, were either held as "safety cushion" against further deterioration of bank asset side and depository base, or to finance corporate and sovereign bond issues (because it is acceptable collateral for central banks), or otherwise to support shortterm investments in equities and derivatives. Only a small part extended corporate and consumer lending. This is not surprising, since in a depression corporations are looking for means of payment to stay in business so they lack proper collateral, whereas households also lack creditworthiness at low levels of wages and employment. In light of the above, we analytically investigate major financial crisis episodes in the mix of fragile, zero or weak, growth trends with bank exposure to loans, bonds, equities and derivatives. In this context the ongoing gradual relinquishment of central bank accommodation policies may play an important part.
Generalizing, this paper analytically explores financial crisis as reflection of weak growth which in turn implies weak profitability. In short financial panics are the trigger and not the cause of depressions. Important implications on crisis theory, economic policy, finance and financial regulation arise from this reasoning.
Financialization, in this context, develops from the inherent contradictions of profit motivated growth as elaborated in Marx (Stravelakis 2012) . Furthermore, the idea that in normal accumulation financial crises are shallow and rare has important implications for finance theory, asset pricing and financial regulation. In this regard we will theorize on empirical evidence initially elaborated by Robert Shiller (Shiller 1980 ) who showed that volatility in dividends cannot explain volatility in stock However, no vast destruction of capital took place and so profit rates stabilized but never increased to growth sustainable levels. In order to restore growth interest rates declined to historical lows, supported by low central bank intervention rates and severe deregulation of the financial sector. The model which follows imitates the growth pattern in the years following the great stagflation. However, contrary to a good part of financialization literature, in our context, the increased weight of finance is triggered by low profitability and is also limited from it. In other words when financial expansion exceeds a certain limit imposed by the rate of profit the system collapses. This understanding of financialization removes the focus from the variety of assets and debt recipients and places it in the underlying conditions of production and growth.
Some introductory remarks are appropriate at this point. Our model rests on the contention that profitability is the driver of growth. This implies of course that investment depends on profitability 2 . Because capitalism is an inherently dynamic system, where balance is reached through the succession of boom and crisis periods, the model is formulated in ratios and rates of growth rather than variable levels (Goodwin 1967 3 ) . In this regard the basic assumption is that the rate of growth of capital advanced (investment over total capital advanced) depends on the net 2 Although this reasoning may seem obvious it is not, at least for economists. A good part of heterodox literature argues that corporate investment slowdown, following the depression of the 1970 s', is independent of profitability. In this regard they explain financialization and the current crisis by applying monopoly theory in relation either to under-consumption arguments, or to the incentives of a rentier strata emerging from monopoly dominance. Below I make express reference to this literature a complete survey, however, is included in Tome 2011.
(corporate) rate of profit, the rate of savings and the rate of effective demand. The latter relies on the share of corporate profit out of total gross profit and the "leverage ratio" as shown below (Eq. I.4'). Furthermore, we make two additional introductory assumptions: 1) production takes time capital is advanced at the beginning of the production period whereas profits are realized at the end of the period and 2)
corporate retained earnings are equal to total social savings. The second assumption (2) suggests that total wage, dividend and interest incomes are fully consumed.
Notation and definitions appear in brief following model equations in the main text and are fully laid out in appendix 1 for easy reference.
Since profitability is the driver of investment a modified Cambridge equation Assuming constant profit (r) and interest (i) rates implies that the leverage ratio (capital over equity) is constant as well. For y max=r/a<1, s=i/r 5 constant and assuming further that variations in equity (EQ) are equal to retained earnings:
, equation (I.1) reads as follows:
Consequently it holds: Equation (I.2) indicates also that parameter (a=Pr/EQ) is the gross return on equity. If (a=r) this implies that capital advanced equals equity or in other words that total debt is zero, which at this level of aggregation means that total investment always equals total savings (see initial assumption 2 above and equation I.4 below).
For a>r, which is equivalent to a positive rate of interest (see equation I.8 below), excess demand appears in the event of corporate profits and excess supply for corporate losses 6 . This last result is made evident in equation (I.4') below. 5 The definition of the rate of savings suggests that corporations adjust retained earnings to the rate of interest. High interest rates imply a high retention ratio and the opposite. 6 I have shown elsewhere (Stravelakis 2012 ) that for a sufficiently high rate of profit and variable interest rates, the latter determined by borrower lender competition, secular or chaotic growth prevails.
In this context periods of excess demand are followed by excess supply the two motions dynamically cancelling each other. The model elaborated here implies deficit financed growth because of the constant, suppressed interest rate assumption, which in turn implies low profit rates. (Stravelakis 2012 ) that if interest rates are left to borrower-lender competition in a low profit rate environment then they will rise to rate of profit levels turning the rate of profit of enterprise to zero.
Banks picked the most profitable option, offering lower interest rates and lending grew from 1980 onwards.
One final assumption suggesting that change in total debt is equal to total investment minus total savings closes the model. In our notation this reads as follows:
Where (L) denotes aggregate borrowing 7 . If debt increases (ΔL>0) this implies excess demand, if it declines (ΔL<0) excess supply. Dividing both sides of (I.4) with ( ) we can rewrite the relation in terms of ratios: Equation (I.4'), mentioned in passing in various occasions above, indicates the deficit financed growth pattern underlying our model which approximates the actual growth pattern experienced during the last thirty years. Because (a) is assumed greater than (r), the corporate profit rate triggers excess demand, which accelerates investment but also debt growth. The opposite holds in the event of corporate losses.
In order to assess the sustainability of this growth pattern we move to model solution. denotes the system "carrying capacity", in other words the maximum value ROE can take. For parameter values (φ<4) maximum ROE remains below carrying capacity and the system exhibits secular or chaotic growth. But for φ>4 ROE at some point pierces the maximum value following which the system collapses. These two states appear in the simulation charts which follow:
In Chart 1 the value of φ is 3.9 and although the rate of growth follows a chaotic pattern involving milder or more severe fluctuations the value of ROE never exceeds "carrying capacity". In the second chart φ=4.06, although a chaotic pattern appears again after several fluctuations the value of ROE slightly exceeds "carrying capacity"
(point marked on chart), following this the rate of growth collapses, return on equity ROE Carrying Capacity growth. In other words a population competes for survival until it exhausts subsistence means following which it declines. In our context this means a limit value beyond which ROE begins to drop. We can determine this value rewriting (I.7) as follows:
The greater the value of the parameter (
) the greater the value ROE can take before declining. Therefore it is reasonable for corporations and banks to seek a rate of interest that will maximize (
. The form has a maximum (derived in appendix 3) for: Equation (I.8) suggests that positive interest rates appear only for a>r justifying the assumption made so far. However, our reasoning supports further elaboration on parameter values. Since the strategy presented is meaningful for a positive rate of profit of enterprise, then there exists a minimum leverage ratio required for growth.
The following expression specifies the minimum:
From (I.9) it is clear that the strategy applies for leverage ratios greater than two (2), otherwise corporations will have no reason to undertake production risks.
Furthermore, the growth rate associated with a particular rate of profit of enterprise is sustainable for ( Although credit expands, during the period which precedes collapse, capital and profits grow faster than debt in most cases 8 . This means that banks experience 8 Since profits grow at a rate equal to the return on equity (ROE), it is not difficult to ascertain that Returning to our main argument, it is clear from (I.11) that financial assets assume a substantial portion of corporate and bank asset side as deficit financed growth proceeds. The latter "sets the scenery" of financial crisis. To explain how it bursts we need to turn to finance theory and asset pricing.
II. Asset Pricing from the Fundamentals, Implications for Financial Crisis:
Alongside with the debt market, incorporated in our framework, we assume, there exists an equity market where trades on corporate and banking shares take place.
Following the unanimously accepted principle that capital mobility tends to equalize risk free returns between sectors (Dybvig & Ross 1992 ), returns in our equity market remain in line with an underlying "required rate of return" (hereafter rror). However, contrary to mainstream wisdom (Campbell 1991) 9 , but very much in line with empirical findings (Shiller 1980) , this required rate of return is not assumed constant and equal to the lifetime rate of return of a particular investment. The reason is that fluctuations in demand produce secular growth patterns, as pictured in Charts 1, 2
above, which in turn alter the rate of return of the corporate sector creating arbitrage 9 Actually in the sited paper Campbell acknowledges the limitations of constant required rates of return also suggested by the efficient market hypothesis.
positions in the equity market. Equity holdings are therefore inherently short-term reflecting short-term corporate sector returns. This in turn implies that equity market risk is roughly equal to that of the corporate sector (Shaikh 1997) . A measure closely associated with the required rate of return is the short-term rate of profit:
Where (u) is capacity utilization. The measure ( ) pictured in (II.1) is a measure of short-term profitability of corporate investment, as opposed to lifetime rate of return which is equal, in our context, to the rate of profit (r). The latter prevails in full capacity utilization. When capacity is underutilized (capacity utilization is bellow unity) gross return on total capital outstanding falls below the basic gross rate of profit, the opposite holds when capacity is over-utilized. Furthermore, variable (irf), appearing in (II.1), measures the risk free interest rate in the current conditions of production and growth. The risk free interest rate is equal to the constant interest rate (i) minus yearly standard deviation of the rate of growth. It enters as negative factor in (II.1) since it represents returns foregone when equity investments are undertaken.
Assuming that capacity utilization (u) equals to the ratio of capital advanced to year-end corporate total capital (equity capital plus borrowed capital) we can denote the measure as follows:
When capital advanced is less than year-end total capital this indicates underutilization of existing capacity. In the event that capital advanced exceeds total capital, for example when customers advance funds against yet undelivered commodities, capacity is over utilized. A good part of past and contemporary economic literature interprets equity market breakdown as the cause of a depression because it precedes it. By extending our framework to encompass equity market arbitrage, stock market collapse again precedes the outburst of depressions without causing it.
Following Shiller (Shiller 1989 ) (in part) we assume that equity prices are given by the following formula:
Where (P) is the aggregate all shares equity index. Equation (II.3) indicates that the rate of growth of stock prices equals to the net required rate of return. When capacity utilization is high the "gross required rate of return" ( ) exceeds the "default free" interest rate and stock prices rise, the opposite holds in low capacity utilization. But increased capacity utilization reflects next year corporate profitability, as shown in equation (II.2'). It is for this reason that stock price reductions/ increases precede reductions/ increases in output and profitability. The simulation chart which follows pictures this result.
Chart 3 presents an unstable return on equity (ROE) path and the stock returns associated with it (blue line). Although sharp corrections and longer losing strings can Regretfully, the whole argument rests on modern investment theory assumptions concerning underlying asset returns. Indicative in this regard is standard pricing of equity index forwards, used hereafter as an example derivative, where the risk free interest rate is the constant required rate of return. In other words "strike price" determination comes from the application of a constant risk free rate (see equation (II.6) below). This same argument is extended further, by assuming normally distributed equity returns, to price "option contracts" under the celebrated BlackScholes framework.
We can price an outright equity forward from our simple framework. Given the simulated data in hand, we can find a time path for index prices from (II.3), and the yearly standard deviation of growth from figures generated by (I.7). This data together with the constant rate of interest are sufficient to price the equity forward under the following standard formulas:
Where (cifr) is (ifr) in compound form and (F) stands for the yearly forward. Equation (II.4) determines the default free interest rate at the beginning of the period, (II.5) is the compound form of (II.4) and (II.6) the formula of the one year forward.
Given our framework of stock returns, but also actual data, it is evident that derivatives are systematically miss-priced since their pricing rely on a theory which has no relevance with actual data. The systematic pattern of derivative pricing against the underlying asset gave rise to a wide range of speculative financial intermediaries seeking higher returns by exploiting derivatives and these intermediaries are no other than the hedge funds.
Banks supported hedge fund growth by granting them credit and derivative lines.
Derivative lines support equity purchases without cash advances, limiting at the same time maximum contract value (notional amount outstanding). Each contract occupies a part of the line determined by the product of underlying asset volatility and contract notional value. This practice, however, relies on the assumption that underlying asset returns follow the normal distribution. In other words that volatility remains roughly stable. If volatility varies and it does, the line may suddenly become insufficient and the borrower will either have to come up with cash or liquidate his positions. For positions "in the money" this is not a problem, actually the bank will extend the line to cover the customer, problems begin when derivatives are "out of the money". But again in a relatively stable growth environment banks will finance derivative losses (by turning the derivative line to a credit line or by rolling over the derivative position) it is again in times of breakdown that things turn dramatic.
By elaborating on the strategy of Macro Hedge Funds we will see how financial crisis becomes possible. Macro Hedge Funds speculate on big fluctuations in asset prices (in our context equity and derivative prices) assuming that it reflects a discrepancy between the market and the underlying fundamentals. By exploiting the discrepancy the hedge fund anticipates extraordinary profits. But this can imply that the normality assumption holds for equity returns as some hedge fund managers suggest (Nicholas 2008 ). More specifically, returns falling more than one standard deviation away from the mean reflect potential miss-pricing, since from the properties of the normal distribution 85% of asset returns should fall within one standard deviation from the mean. Furthermore, if asset returns are "normally distributed" this implies also that the underlying fundamentals are roughly stable as well. Therefore, any diversion will generate an opposite motion, since it comes from random occurrences.
The chart which follows (chart 4) compares the distribution optimally fitting equity returns generated from (II.1) (blue line), with a normal distribution calculated from the mean and standard deviation of the same data (purple line).
The distribution best fitting the data is a four parameter Dagum distribution Instead they witnessed market collapse. Banks experiencing, during the same period, deterioration of their depository base were reluctant to finance these losses. This was the reason many macro hedge funds failed in the period of the financial crisis.
10 This is by no means an exhaustion of potential hedge fund strategies but only a simplistic example.
However, we can safely claim that almost every macro hedge fund strategy is vulnerable to extreme negative returns. part of this liquidity to consumer lending, lower quality mortgages were turned to "collateralized debt obligations" (CDOs). The latter is the "subprime" mortgage backed securities market which triggered the depression. As interest rates were suppressed to historical lows from 1980 onwards mortgage backed securities gradually assumed the greatest part of bond markets. The reason is simple they offered a premium over corporate and sovereign bonds of the same rating, the premium representing compensation against the uncertainty of mortgage refinance.
Consequently as interest rates declined and the likelihood of mortgage refinance was reduced these securities became more and more attractive. However, the market underplayed the risk that banks would be unable or reluctant to refinance bad mortgages, in other words the market underplayed the likelihood of a depression as elaborated below.
Although we can only consider securities "backed" by corporate loans in our context, the valuation method is valid for other types of asset backed securities. For reasons of simplicity we will assume that half of the bank loan portfolio comprises of productive corporations paying interest at a rate below the average (i), while the other half pays interest at a rate above average. We will assume further that banks pool their loans in two units (tranches) one involving productive low-interest corporate loans and the other unproductive high interest loans. They then issue one year securities on each unit which they sell through "special purpose vehicles". Returns, risks and excess returns for both units appear in the equations which follow:
Where (rtr) stands for return on tranches 1 and 2 and (rope) denotes the rate of profit of enterprise for the two corporate groups. Expected excess returns, denoted as (ertr), are equal to half the annual volatility of growth for group 1 and one and a half (1.5) times volatility of growth for group 2. Although the first unit will have a positive rate of profit of enterprise if r>i (II.7), the second unit may experience negative (rope) even if the corporations included have an average rate of profit equal to the economy average (II.8). Therefore in highly volatile growth security holders rely on the willingness of banks to refinance these loans, which in turn rests on the conviction that growth will resume enabling the borrower to perform. This is of course the case when banks are liquid. But when bank liquidity deteriorates like the times close to breakdown things change. The simulation chart which follows pictures the risk associated with unit 2 securities in various states of the economy.
The blue line is the rate of profit of enterprise of unit 2 calculated as in (II.8).
The purple line is the return on equity (gross profit growth) for the whole economy as before and the black line the rate of growth of profit less the rate of growth of debt.
The latter is a measure of bank liquidity growth. Although the rate of profit of enterprise turns negative in many occasions, profits catch up quickly and banks refinance low-grade debt. At the eve of breakdown however (marked by the arrow on chart 5) as the rate of profit of enterprise of unit 2 turns negative banks experience a huge decline in liquidity, because the corporate sector as a whole experiences losses.
As result low-grade loans do not get refinanced and asset backed security holders experience huge losses.
The scenario presented roughly imitates the collapse of the sub-prime market in the U.S. Securities issued on low-grade mortgages, the so-called "toxic" unit, were held on the assumption that the housing market will keep growing and collateral will Sticking to the "Volcker rule" because of concreteness we note that its' main aim is to prevent banks from assuming equity and derivative risk through hedge funds and other vehicles, but does not prevent them from running that risk directly in their balance sheet. The only factor discouraging assimilation of risk is increasing capital requirements. This is a policy relying on the assumption that financial assets carry a particular amount of relatively stable risk. If risk is stable banks can securitize depositors by assigning the appropriate amount of additional capital to back risky assets appropriations. But, as we have shown above, this does not hold especially when growth trends turn unstable, in such times capital requirements will prove insufficient and the taxpayer will again lift the burden. The "Volcker rule" is the latest chapter in a long series of regulations going back to the "Peel act" 12 in mid-19th century England. Marx in Capital VIII (Marx 1959 ) mocked this early policy for being useless when the system was in normal accumulation and was withdrawn in the crisis of the 1850 s' to avoid bank failures.
The target of bank regulation is to protect the broad public, at least in part.
Given uncertainty underlying financial markets, the rules applied must focus on what kind of assets pension funds, banks and the broad public can hold and to what proportions, in order to contain future damages. Depressions cannot be managed away through appropriate policies, because they emerge from the contradictions of profit motivated growth. This is why depressions appear every thirty to forty years the first on record dated as back as 1790. In this regard financial crises will always be a potential trigger of such events and regulation policies can only mediate losses by directly constraining risk. This means that institutions which take deposits or pension plan installments cannot hold just any kind of risky asset and the assets permitted cannot assume just any proportion of the asset side.
Returning to the present, the likelihood of a new major financial crisis depends on how stable is the roughly stagnant growth path prevailing. Stability seems to rely on the extraordinary liquidity measures primarily of the Fed, the Bank of Japan and secondarily of the ECB. These policies are keeping interest rates low. Capital impairment that would boost the rate of profit leading to gradual recovery seems to 12 The Peel act of 1844 named after the British premier Sir Robert Peel on one hand prevented commercial banks from issuing their own banknotes and on the other placed restrictions on the bank of England in issuing banknotes. The idea was that with the restrictions in place inflation would remain stable and financial panics would seize to appear. Marx scorns the fact that the restrictions of the act were never needed /applied in normal accumulation and the act was abandoned altogether when the system entered a depression.
move in a slow and contradictory pace. Therefore when these policies are withdrawn financial panics and sharp corrections cannot be ruled out.
Overall the resolution of the present depression is proceeding at a very slow pace so far. Looking back to the history of crises it resembles the 1870-1890 depression, the longest on record. Therefore policy makers should be very cautious in declaring the end of the crisis and should focus on its' devastating consequences instead.
Summary:
We presented a simple framework analytically supporting the notion that profit driven growth turns unstable when the rate of profit is below a certain limit. shown that wage suppression, standing behind austerity policies, is not sufficient for restoring the rate of profit. Moreover, Keynesian "trickle down" policies justifying fiscal expansion are not effective in depression times when profit rates are low.
Alternative policies relying on state direct investment in order to boost employment are appropriate now that profit motivated growth has broken down.
Elaborating on the characteristics and limitations of such policy will be the focus of future work. 
Appendix 1 Notation and Definitions

